A pro se patent applicant filed a micro entity certification in December 2024 based on the USPTO's own published guidance. The enforcement framework used to penalize that filing did not yet exist. It was announced seven months later, implemented ten months later, and then applied retroactively — demanding documentation from fourteen months prior that had been automatically deleted long before any duty to preserve arose.
When the applicant called the USPTO seeking procedural guidance, employees acknowledged they had been given "direction of the office" not to discuss the proceedings. A second employee, upon reviewing the show cause order itself, admitted it "doesn't look like they provide any items you specifically must provide to meet that." Both calls were recorded. Both recordings are published here.
On February 24, 2026, a federal mandamus action is scheduled to be filed in the District of New Jersey. The February 26 publication deadline for the application creates a two-day window for judicial intervention. If this program is operating beyond statutory authority, every active suspension it has imposed may be unlawful.
- USPTO's show cause program is new. Its legal basis has never been tested in federal court. This case may be the first.
- Two independent employees on two separate recorded calls confirmed the same institutional directive to withhold information from applicants.
- If the ultra vires suspension argument succeeds, every prosecution suspended under this program is potentially invalid — affecting an unknown number of applicants.
- The December 1 confirmation that the response was "correct," reversed 59 days later without explanation, raises questions about fair notice that apply to every applicant who received a show cause order.
- All primary source documents and unedited audio are publicly available and downloadable at uspto.news.
Does the USPTO Have the Legal Authority
to Hold a Patent Hostage?
The fee Torres owed was paid in full on November 19, 2025 — overpaid, in fact, by $38. What remains is a disputed penalty: a punitive fine the agency assessed after the fact. The USPTO is now threatening to permanently abandon his patent application unless he pays that fine by April 2, 2026.
That threat is the central legal question in this case: Can a federal agency hold a patent application hostage to collect a contested debt?
Torres argues the answer is no — and that the USPTO's own Final Determination proves it. On page 4 of that document, the agency explicitly invokes federal debt collection law as the proper mechanism for collecting the penalty: referral to the Bureau of Fiscal Services, potential Department of Justice referral, and tax refund offsets under 31 U.S.C. § 3717. In the same document, it also threatens to abandon the application if the penalty goes unpaid.
Two collection mechanisms. One debt. The agency cited the legal one and used the illegal one. Torres's complaint argues you cannot do both — and that using prosecution suspension as a debt collection tool, when Congress established a separate mechanism for exactly that purpose, is an action the agency simply does not have the authority to take.
35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) commands that patent applications "shall be published" promptly after 18 months. The word "shall" is mandatory. Congress wrote no exception for disputed penalties, show cause proceedings, or administrative sanctions.
The USPTO's suspension authority extends to unpaid fees required by Title 35 — filing fees, examination fees, maintenance fees. A punitive sanction assessed under 35 U.S.C. §§ 41(j) and 123(f) is not a required fee. It is a debt, collectible through federal debt procedures. Conflating the two to justify suspension of a mandatory publication command is, the complaint argues, beyond what the statute authorizes.
Under Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024), federal courts no longer defer to an agency's interpretation of its own authority. The judge deciding this case reads the statute independently. The statute says "shall be published." No exceptions are listed. The question answers itself.
The Supreme Court established in Frost v. Railroad Commission (1926) that the government cannot condition the exercise of a statutory right on waiver of a legal challenge. The USPTO is threatening permanent abandonment — loss of the statutory property right embodied in a granted patent application — unless Torres pays a penalty whose legality is now before a federal judge.
That is precisely the condition Frost prohibits. Pay first, challenge later — after the application is gone — is not a meaningful legal remedy. It is a demand that Torres surrender his right to contest the penalty in exchange for keeping the very property the penalty threatens to destroy.
Agent I.: "Right." — Agent I., Office of Petitions · February 2, 2026 · Recorded · Exhibit M
Agent I.: "Right."
| Claim | Legal Basis | Core Argument | Significance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ultra Vires Suspension Systemic |
35 U.S.C. § 111, § 122(b)(1)(A) Louisiana PSC v. FCC (1986) |
The fee deficiency has been paid. Only a disputed penalty remains. A penalty is not a "required fee" under Title 35. USPTO has no statutory authority to suspend prosecution to compel penalty payment. | If successful, potentially invalidates every active prosecution suspension in the show cause program. |
| Due Process — Fair Notice Strong |
Fifth Amendment; Mullane v. Central Hanover | Show cause order failed to cite the "reasonable inquiry" standard, 37 CFR 11.18(b), or the OG Notice. Applicant could not have known what was required. Standards appeared for the first time in the penalty determination. | Structural defect in every show cause order issued under this program. |
| Plain English Doctrine Medium |
FCC v. Fox; Grayned v. City of Rockford | Agency used ordinary language — "explanation supported by sufficient evidence" — while applying an undisclosed technical standard. An agency cannot use plain English in notices and penalize applicants for failing to divine unstated regulatory requirements. | Directly supported by Agent I.'s admission that the order fails to specify what is required. |
| Reasonable Reliance Strong |
Vestal v. United States; Accardi doctrine | On December 1, USPTO told Applicant the response "appears to be correct." Applicant relied on this. 59 days later, the same submission was penalized without any explanation of the reversal. | Binding on the government regardless of internal agency reconsideration. |
| Retroactive Application Strong |
Landgraf v. USI Film Products; Bowen v. Georgetown | Enforcement framework announced July 2025 and implemented October 2025 was applied to a December 2024 certification. Demands evidence from before the framework existed, preserved before any duty to preserve arose. | All three temporal impossibilities independently support this claim. |
| Pattern & Practice — Due Process Systemic |
Fifth Amendment; Withrow v. Larkin | Five employees across three months — confirmed by two on recorded calls — enacted a coordinated institutional directive to withhold procedural information from applicants with pending penalties. This is not confusion; it is documented coordination. | Discovery of internal communications would expose who issued the directive, when, and how many applicants were affected. |
| Void for Vagueness Strong |
Fifth Amendment; United States v. Williams (2008); FCC v. Fox (2012) | Three sequential agency documents treated the evidentiary requirement differently — illustrative in the Gazette, undefined in the show cause order, mandatory in the penalty determination. The enforcing employee stated three times she was "really not sure" what would satisfy the standard, three days after enforcement. A standard that confuses its own enforcers is unconstitutionally vague as a matter of law. | Directly supported by Agent I.'s own recorded admissions reviewing the agency's document in real time. |
| Structural Bias — Same-Team Review Strong |
Fifth Amendment; Withrow v. Larkin (1975) | Agent I. confirmed on a recorded call that the petition challenging the penalty is reviewed by "the same team" that imposed it — the fraud mitigation unit. An adjudicative body that reviews its own decisions is not a neutral tribunal. The structural bias infects every administrative remedy available, making meaningful agency review impossible. | Recorded admission from an Office of Petitions employee describing the review structure three days after the penalty issued. |
| Equal Protection — Pro Se Disparate Impact Systemic |
Fifth Amendment Equal Protection; Arlington Heights (1977); Haines v. Kerner (1972) | Congress created micro entity status specifically to reduce barriers for financially constrained inventors. The show cause program as administered — vague standards, mandatory information blackout, retroactive application, impossible evidence demands, same-team review — eliminates that benefit by imposing compliance burdens that require precisely the legal resources Congress sought to compensate for. The program inverts the statute it administers. | Agent I.'s admission — "if I'm not familiar and I work here, then I can understand how someone approaching the applicant would be confused" — documents the knowledge differential that falls entirely on pro se applicants. | 28 U.S.C. § 1361; 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) | Publication is a statutory command ("shall be published"). A policy statement in the Official Gazette cannot override a mandatory statute. Suspension pending a disputed penalty payment has no basis in Title 35. | Two-day window: federal filing February 24, publication deadline February 26. |
Is Already Published
All primary source documents — petitions, exhibits, unedited audio recordings, and federal court filings as filed — are available at uspto.news without registration. Audio is cleared for broadcast use under New Jersey's one-party consent law (N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-4). No materials have been altered. For interview requests, unpublished archive access, or verification of any claim on this page, contact press@uspto.news with subject line "PRESS."